Police in Iceland have said a highly sophisticated phishing attack is the largest ever cyberattack the country has ever experienced. The campaign saw thousands of messages sent that attempted to get Icelanders to install a remote access tool that would give the attackers full access to their computers.
The software used in this campaign is a legitimate remote access tool called Remcos. Remcos is used to allow remote access to a computer, often for the purpose of providing IT support, for surveillance, or as an anti-theft tool for laptop computers. However, while it was developed for legitimate use, because it gives the administrator full control over the computer once installed, it has significant potential to be used for malicious purposes. Unsurprisingly, Remcos has been used by cybercriminals in several malware campaigns in the past, often conducted via spear phishing campaigns. One notable attack involved the spoofing of the Turkish Revenue Administration, Turkey’s equivalent of the IRS, to get the RAT installed to provide access to victim’s computers.
The use of Remcos for malicious purposes violates the terms and conditions of use. If discovered, the developer can block the customer’s license to prevent use of the software. However, during the time that Remcos is present on a system, considerable harm can be caused – sabotage, theft of sensitive information, installation of malicious software, and file encryption with ransomware to name but a few.
As was the case in Turkey, the phishing campaign in Iceland attempted to fool end users into installing the program through deception. In this case, the emails claimed to have come from the Icelandic Police. The emails used fear to get recipients of the message to click a link in the email and download the remote access tool.
The emails informed the recipients that they were required to visit the police for questioning. Urgency was added by informing the recipient of the message that an arrest warrant would be issued if they failed to respond. Clicking the link in the email directed the user to what appeared to be the correct website of the Icelandic police. The website was a carbon copy of the legitimate website and required the visitor to enter their Social Security number along with an authentication code sent in the email to find out more information about the police case.
In Iceland, Social Security numbers are often required on websites to access official services, so the request would not appear unusual. On official websites, Social Security numbers are checked against a database and are rejected if they are not genuine. In this case, the attacker was also able to check the validity of the SSN, which means access to a database had been gained, most likely an old database that had been previously leaked or the attacker may have had legitimate access and misused the database.
After entering the information, a password protected archive was downloaded which allegedly contained documents with details of the case. The webpage provided the password to unlock the password protected archive, which contained a .scr file disguised as a Word document.
In this case, the RAT was augmented with a VBS script to ensure it ran on startup. The RAT had keylogging and password stealing capabilities and was used to steal banking credentials. After gaining access to banking credentials, the information was sent back to command and control servers in Germany and the Netherlands.
While the campaign looked entirely legitimate, a common trick was used to fool recipients of the email, which number in the thousands. The domain used in the attack closely resembled the official police website, logreglan.is but contained a lower case i instead of the second l – logregian.is. A casual glance at the sender of the email or the domain name in the address bar would unlikely reveal the domain was not genuine. Further, the link in the email replaced the lower case i with a capital I, which is almost impossible to distinguish from a lower-case L.
The Icelandic police responded quickly to the attack and the malicious domain was taken down the following day. It is unknown how may people fell for the scam.